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Summary. – Interactions between agricultural technology improvements, risk reducing 
behavior, and gender roles in agricultural production in Mozambique are examined. The analysis 
employs a CGE model that explicitly incorporates key features of the economy. These include: 
detailed accounting of marketing margins, home consumption, risk, and gender roles in agricultural 
production. Our results show that agricultural technology improvements benefit both male and 
female occupants of rural households. Due to economic interactions, agricultural technology 
improvements are particularly compelling when combined with marketing system improvements. 
Moreover, technological change in cassava appears to be a particularly strong lever for increasing 
female and overall household welfare, especially when risk is considered. 
 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 
The growing mass of microeconomic evidence supporting the key role, which women 
play in the development process, has led to calls for much greater consideration of gender issues 
in economic policy-making. A special issue of World Development (vol. 23, no. 11, 1995) was 
devoted to gender and macroeconomics. The articles in this issue provide, among other things, 
frameworks for introducing gender into macroeconomic models (Darity; Elson; Palmer; and 
Walters). In addition, due to the relatively recent nature of the research, suggestions for future 
work are also provided. For example, Çaatay, Elson, and Grown state in the introductory article: 
 
Much remains to be done, particularly in developing more complex and insightful 
gender-aware models. Several further projects suggest themselves: the introduction of 
gender into computable general equilibrium models of the sort that have been used to 
investigate income distribution and structural adjustment;... (1995, p. 1833).  
                                                 
* The authors would like to express their gratitude to two anonymous referees for pertinent and helpful comments. 
Thanks are also due to the editors for relevant points and suggestions. The usual caveats apply. 
In this article, a computable general equilibrium (CGE) model is employed to analyze the 
interactions between agricultural technology improvement, risk, and gender roles in agricultural 
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production in Mozambique. These interactions are important. The population of Mozambique is 
predominantly rural and overwhelmingly poor. Analysis of data from the 1996-97 marketing year 
(a good production year) revealed that 64% of the rural population had insufficient calories 
available to meet the caloric requirements of household members (MPF/UEM/IFPRI, 1998). As 
detailed in the next section, women figure prominently in agricultural activities (as well as in 
domestic tasks); cassava is an important food crop; rural households are heavily dependent on 
agriculture for income; and climate induced variability in agricultural production can be large 
(Rojas and Amade, 1997). Furthermore, gender asymmetries within households are distinct. The 
CGE model employed here contains significant agricultural sector detail and a number of other 
unique features which are needed to capture the basic structural characteristics of the 
Mozambican economy. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 summarizes gender roles in 
rural households and the agricultural sector. Section 3 presents the CGE model with a focus on 
special features. Section 4 presents model simulations and results. A final section concludes and 
provides suggestions for future research. 
 
 
2. A GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM PERSPECTIVE ON GENDER AND AGRICULTURE IN 
MOZAMBIQUE 
 
In moving from a microeconomic, household approach to a macroeconomic, general 
equilibrium approach, some detail is necessarily suppressed. As usual, there are numerous pitfalls 
for the generalizer. However, the results and conclusions from our analyses, explained in sections 
4 and 5, are driven primarily by a few features relating to gender roles and the characteristics of 
the agricultural sector in Mozambique. These features are in focus in this section. 
First, rural women are busy people. Studies undertaken by de Sousa (1997) and Adam 
and Coimbra (1996) considered time allocation by rural women and men. These studies found 
that rural women and men allocate roughly equal amounts of time to crop production, women 
allocate more time to fetching water, and men allocate more time to livestock production. 
Overall, women’s time allocated to these three activities alone exceeded men’s time. While both 
men and women allocate time to other activities, the list of additional tasks for women is long 
and daunting. It includes: food processing, cooking, cleaning, other housekeeping, collection of 
firewood, and childcare. In review of the evidence, Naeraa-Nicolajsen (1998) concludes that rural 
women in Mozambique work long hours and have far less leisure time than rural men.i 
Second, as alluded to in the preceding paragraph, gender roles in household activities 
exist.Women bear almost all of the burden of domestic tasks, including the daily provision of 
meals, and women are responsible for ensuring food security at the household level 
(Naeraa-Nicolajsen, 1998). Similarly, a reasonably coherent story of sex roles in agricultural 
production emerges from recent research. Clearing land and rearing livestock are primarily male 
activities (DNDR, 1992; Liberman, 1989; MAP/MSU, 1997; ZADP, 1997). Women tend to be 
heavily involved in the production of food crops (including maize and cassava in particular) 
while production responsibility for cash crops tends to be more equally divided between men and 
women (Waterhouse, 1997; Liberman, 1989; Pitcher, 1996). 
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Third, agriculture is the critical income source for the large majority of rural households. 
In a study of 2,176 farm households in Nampula province for the 1995-96 cropping year, Benfica 
(1998) finds that agriculture accounted for 88% of household income (with a valuation given to 
home consumed production and remittances excluded). As indicated above, women are strongly 
involved in agricultural production. According to Benfica, home consumed staple foods, the 
production of which involves women most deeply, represented 53% of total household income. 
A national survey conducted in 1996-97 gives similar results on the importance of agriculture to 
rural households. Analysis of these data finds only a small proportion of the rural population 
engaged in activities outside of agriculture (Datt, Simler, Mukherjee, and Dava, 1999, p. 29). 
Fourth, cassava is an important crop in terms of total production and has distinct risk 
reducing attributes. Critically for gender related issues, available data indicate that women 
provide the large majority of labor input into cassava production. According to Early Warning 
System data, the area allocated to cassava, 1.0 million ha in 1996-97, is second only to maize, 1.2 
million ha in 1996-97. Fresh cassava yields on a per hectare basis exceed maize yields by a factor 
of approximately six. As a result, fresh cassava production substantially exceeds maize 
production (Early Warning System, 1998). Despite the large supply, fresh cassava prices are 
relatively firm (SIMA, 1998). Large marketing margins create a very significant wedge between 
the price of fresh cassava to the consumer and the price at the farmgate. In the 1995 social 
accounting matrix on which the CGE analysis in subsequent sections is based, the farmgate price 
of cassava is less than 25% of the consumer marketed price. However, even after accounting for 
the large marketing margins, cassava is the most important crop in Mozambique in value terms. 
According to national accounts data, the value of cassava production at producer prices exceeded 
the value of maize production (the other major crop) by 42% and 33% in 1995 and 1996 
respectively (NIS, 1998). 
The hardiness of cassava is a particularly attractive factor. Adverse climate conditions, 
defined as a climate outcome producing a greater than 25% decline in maize yields relative to the 
most likely of five climate scenarios, are estimated to occur 18%, 30%, and 63% of the time in 
the North, Center, and South of Mozambique respectively (Rojas and Amade, 1997). With rural 
income almost totally dependent on agriculture and insufficient to cover the full caloric needs of 
most of the rural population even following a good harvest, drought and disease tolerance are 
attractive properties. In addition, cassava is well adapted to soils with low fertility (Cock, 1985), 
and it can support drought periods of up to eight months making it relatively tolerant of seasonal 
drought (Osiru, Porto, and Kanayake, 1995). Furthermore, relative to most other crops, cassava is 
less demanding in terms of the timing of labor inputs; and, according to the International Center 
for Tropical Agriculture, it exhibits “an unrivaled ability to recover from pests and diseases” 
(CIAT, 1999). Cassava is also a relatively convenient food source. Cassava root stores easily as it 
is essentially left in the ground until needed (Bay, 1998). During the growing season, cassava 
leaves serve as an additional food source. In sum, the above properties make cassava attractive as 
a risk reducing crop. Cock refers to cassava as a “famine reserve crop” (1985, p. 20).  
Labor availability is the primary constraint to cassava production.ii Detailed information 
on labor input into cassava in Mozambique is not readily available. Cock reviews cross country 
evidence and concludes that “per hectare, cassava requires more labor than most other starchy 
staples” (1985, p. 56). More recent crop budgets from Côte d’Ivoire show that hand weeding 
constitutes the single largest labor input in smallholder cassava production. In these budgets, 
  4 
smallholder cassava requires approximately 80 labor days per year (Haly, 1990). This accords 
roughly with the 78 labor days per year required for maize in Mozambique estimated by Moll 
(1993). Weeding is a particularly heavy input for cassava due to the length of the production 
cycle. The production cycle for cassava varieties grown in Mozambique takes nine to 12 months 
(Bay, 1998). In short, area planted, production, price, and available crop budget information for 
cassava point to very substantial aggregate labor input to this crop. Finally, cassava’s status as a 
food crop and the importance of weeding labor requirements imply a substantial role for female 
labor in cassava production. It is a crop for which women rather than men have responsibility. 
 
 
3. A CGE MODEL FOR MOZAMBIQUE 
 
The model employed for the present analysis is in many ways standard.iii However, the 
Mozambique model exhibits a number of important departures from traditional neoclassical CGE 
models. These departures, plus a brief description of other model characteristics, are in focus in 
this section. Nevertheless, the model employed for this analysis still omits much, so important 
omissions are discussed at the end of this section. The full set of model equations is available in 
the appendix. 
 
 
(a) Marketing margins 
 
Margins between the price paid at the source of supply, such as the farm gate, and the 
price paid by the final consumer are often very large (e.g., cassava as mentioned above). High 
marketing costs reflect: iv large distances between production and consumption centers, poor 
infrastructure, high costs of capital which result in high costs of holding inventories, and high 
risks associated with trading activities combined with limited opportunities for diversification. 
They are particularly large in primary agriculture and primary agriculture processing. In the 1995 
social accounting matrix (Arndt, Cruz, Jensen, Robinson, and Tarp, 1998), these two sectors 
account for 70% of total spending on marketing margins. In the model, marketing margins are 
carefully accounted for. In addition, marketing margin rates vary depending upon whether the 
product is produced and sold domestically, exported, or imported.  
Operationally, the marketing margins enter the price linkage equations. For example, 
consider the link between marketed and home consumed commodity prices shown in equation 
(1). 
 
 
  
The market price of a domestically produced commodity i, PDCi, is equal to the domestic home 
consumption price of good i, PDCHi, plus the number of units of marketing services required to 
market commodity i, MRDi, multiplied by the price of marketing services, PQAimr. The same 
premise applies to exported and imported commodities. These marketing services create a wedge 
between border and domestic prices for imports, factory gate, and border prices for exports, and 
factory gate and domestic prices for commodities which are produced and consumed locally.  
PDC
i
 = PDCH
i
 + MRD
i
  PQA
imr
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The commerce activity, which provides marketing services, is capital intensive. This 
reflects the capital intensity of the transport, inventory, and trading activities that it is designed to 
represent.v Due to the capital intensity of the commerce sector, returns to capital have a strong 
impact on marketing services prices. In addition, generalized capital scarcity within the economy 
constrains the growth of marketed production, particularly agricultural production. Even though 
agricultural production activities are very labor intensive, the capital required to market the 
products limits expansion of marketed agricultural production. 
 
 
(b) Home consumption 
 
The presence of high marketing margins implies a significant wedge between the 
factory/farm gate sales price and the purchase price for consumption of a given commodity. 
Rather than sell at a low price and purchase at a high price, households, particularly rural 
agricultural households, can opt to consume at least some of what they produce. In this manner, 
marketing margins are avoided.  
Home and marketed consumption of all commodities is captured in a linear expenditure 
system (LES) formulation. Home and marketed commodities are treated as separate commodities 
in the system. So, for example, home consumed maize differs from marketed maize. In this 
formulation, supernumerary income, defined as household income less savings, taxes, and the 
cost of minimum consumption levels of both home and marketed commodities, is allocated 
across commodities via share parameters. Elasticities of substitution between home and marketed 
commodities are determined by minimum consumption parameters. If these minimum 
consumption parameters are set to zero, the LES formulation collapses to a Cobb-Douglas utility 
function with elasticities of substitution equal to one.vi 
The parameters of the utility function (estimation described in Arndt, Robinson, and 
Tarp, 1999), set the quantity of home consumption to be relatively insensitive to changes in price 
through relatively high values on the minimum consumption parameters, especially for rural 
households. This implies that marketed production of agricultural commodities will tend to be 
more variable than total production volume as rural households will sell more surplus in good 
years and retain a greater share of harvest to meet family needs in poor years. 
While large marketing margins and high shares of home consumption are common 
features of African economies, this is the first CGE model, of which the authors are aware, of an 
African economy that simultaneously captures these features. 
 
 
(c) Male and female agricultural labor 
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Agricultural labor is divided into male and female categories. The percentages of total 
labor allocated to the female categories for each crop are presented in Table 1. As emphasized 
above, cassava production is female dominated. These percentages reflect the available data on 
gender roles in agricultural production summarized in the previous section, interviews with 
knowledgeable individuals in Mozambique, and the judgement of the authors. The division of 
labor presented in Table 1 implies that 63% of agricultural labor is undertaken by women. This 
accords reasonably well with the 60% figure calculated by Pehrsson (1993). Even though time 
allocation studies show roughly equal time working in agricultural production for women and 
men, these are reasonable figures since there are more working age women in rural areas than 
working age men. Due to the war and male migration for off-farm work, slightly more than one 
rural household in five is female headed (Datt, Simler, Mukherjee, and Dava, 1999). In addition, 
due primarily to the war, females represented 53% of the population in 1997 as opposed to 51% 
in 1981, the year just prior to the onset of hostilities (NIS, 1999). The effects of the war on the 
gender structure of the population are certain to be strongest in the working age cohort.  
 
 [Table 1 about here] 
 
(d) Risk aversion 
 
Low incomes, rudimentary technology, heavy dependence on agriculture, and a variable 
climate generate a strong need for risk reduction strategies among rural households. Gender 
inequality may also make women in rural households more risk averse than men.vii In more 
recent household models, men and women are therefore treated as separate agents with different, 
often competing, interests and, potentially, an unequal power structure. Under these conditions 
women may not be sure to have access to an adequate share of family cash income. Different 
attitudes to risk are likely, especially when women are responsible for food security at the 
household level as in the case of Mozambique. 
As mentioned above, cassava is drought tolerant, resistant to disease, relatively flexible 
with respect to timing of labor inputs, and easy to store. Due to these attractive risk reducing 
properties and the control which women exert over cassava, we assume, in some of the 
simulations in the next section, that cassava plays an explicit role in risk reduction. Specifically, 
we assume that a safety first strategy is pursued. Under this strategy, households aim to produce a 
certain (exogenous) amount of cassava for risk reduction purposes only. Once the resources 
necessary to produce the minimum amount of cassava have been allocated, the household 
allocates resources to other agricultural and non-agricultural activities in accordance with relative 
prices. 
The safety first risk aversion strategy is implemented by adding an endogenous variable, 
RISKj, that serves as a risk premium. The variable RISKj enters the factor demand equation (2) 
and factor income equation (3): 
 
 
 
FDSC
jf
  =  
RISK
j
  QA
j
  PV
j
  α
jf
WF
f
  WFDIST
jf
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where FDSCjf represents use of factor f in activity j. QAj is output of activity j, PVj the value 
added price of activity j, αjf the cost share of factor f in production of the value added aggregate 
for activity j, WFf the price (wage or rental rate) of factor f, YFCTRf total income for factor f, 
and WFDISTjf a scaling factor that allows factor returns to differ by sector (when capital is fixed 
in one sector for example). 
As shown in equation (2), a value greater than one for the variable RISKj implies that 
more factors are allocated to the production of activity j than pure profit maximization would 
dictate. Activity j might be cassava, whose risk reducing properties cause farmers to allocate 
extra resources to cassava production. This risk based allocation of resources to activity j comes 
at a cost in terms of factor income. In the factor income equation (3), returns to factors allocated 
to the activity j are reduced by the risk premium factor represented by the variable RISKj. In the 
risk scenarios, the risk premium on cassava production is complementary to cassava production. 
That is, as long as the value for the variable RISKcassava is greater than one, cassava production 
(QAcassava) is fixed at base levels while the risk premium is endogenous. If, as in some of the 
experiments, the value for RISKcassava is driven to one (e.g., the risk premium is eliminated), 
cassava production is then permitted to increase.  
 
 
(e) Other features plus parameter estimation and model validation 
 
Besides male and female agricultural labor, a third category of labor, non-agricultural 
labor, is also included. The simulation results presented below are based on a formulation with 
separate labor pools fixed in agriculture or non-agriculture.viii As mentioned above, remaining 
elements of the model are standard. Capital is mobile across sectors (excepting capital associated 
with mining and fishing activities). Production technology is Cobb-Douglas in value added.ix 
This value added aggregate combines with intermediate products in a Leontief fashion. The 
model contains a rural and an urban household. The model is closed by fixing the value of 
foreign currency inflows and allowing the exchange rate to adjust endogenously. This closure is 
the most logical due to the importance of aid flows. 
Base data for the model is derived from the 1995 social accounting matrix (SAM) for 
Mozambique (Arndt, Cruz, Jensen, Robinson, and Tarp, 1998). The SAM contains detailed 
primary agriculture, primary agriculture processing, and marketing cost accounts. Simulations are 
conducted on a slightly aggregated SAM containing 10 primary product activities, three primary 
agriculture processing activities, five industrial activities, and 10 service activities. Excepting the 
commerce activity, to which there is no corresponding commodity, activities and commodities 
correspond one to one. 
A novel maximum entropy approach was employed to validate the model and to estimate 
behavioral parameters (Arndt, Robinson, and Tarp, 1999). Briefly, the full CGE model was 
backcasted to follow the historical record for the period 1996 to 1992 (five observations). Import 
YFCTR
f
   =  
i
WF
f
  FDSC
jf
  





WFDISTjf
RISK
j
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(CES) and export (CET) parameters, LES preference parameters, and technical change 
parameters were chosen which permitted the model to best reproduce the historical record 
conditional on a set of prior distributions for these parameters. Measures of goodness of fit 
indicated that the model is capable of reproducing many of the salient aspects of recent economic 
history in Mozambique, reported in Arndt, Jensen, and Tarp (1999). 
In order to reduce computational burden, a fairly aggregate version of the model was 
employed in the estimation/validation procedure. In parameterizing the more disaggregate model 
employed here, the parameter value estimated for an aggregate is assigned to all of its 
components. For example, the Armington import elasticity estimated for the aggregate food crops 
was assigned to all components of that aggregate. Therefore, commodities like grains and other 
basic food crops, which were components of the aggregate food crops, are assumed to have the 
same Armington import elasticity in the simulations conducted here. 
 
 
(f) Important omissions 
 
While capturing many salient features of the Mozambican economy, the model used in 
this paper also misses much. Perhaps most importantly, production within the household and 
other intra-household resource allocation issues are ignored. For example, traditional processing 
of cassava is a time-consuming, within-household task undertaken almost exclusively by women. 
Since formal studies of time allocation to cassava processing have not been undertaken in 
Mozambique, a precise estimate of time allocation to cassava processing is not available. 
However, time allocation studies have been undertaken in other African countries. For example, 
Adekanye (1985) finds significant time allocated by rural women in Nigeria to the processing of 
cassava into gari, a local staple. Improved treatment of gender and resource allocation issues as 
well as production activities within the household are therefore critical topics for future research 
and data generation work. 
 
 
4. SIMULATIONS AND RESULTS 
 
In order to examine the interactions between agricultural technology improvements, risk 
reducing behavior in cassava production, and gender roles in agricultural production, a series of 
four experiments were conducted. They are: 
 
(i) A 30% Hicks-neutral increase in agricultural productivity in all agricultural commodities 
excepting cassava. 
 
(ii) A 30% Hicks-neutral increase in agricultural productivity in all agricultural commodities. 
 
(iii) A 15% decline in marketing margins for all commodities. 
 
(iv) Experiments two and three combined. 
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Each of these experiments was conducted under the alternative assumption of the presence or 
absence of risk reducing behavior in cassava production. Thus, results from a total of eight 
simulations are presented. 
The simulations were designed to reflect plausible shocks to the economy over the 
medium term. Agricultural technology in Mozambique is highly rudimentary. At the same time, 
agricultural potential is high. Given the divergence between performance and potential, a 30% 
technology increase is reasonable to conservative. In the family sector (which dominates 
agricultural production), the most promising new technologies come in the form of improved 
seed and better farming practices, especially higher planting densities. In addition, agricultural 
chemical use is practically zero at the moment. Use of agricultural chemicals offers promise for 
increased production in high potential regions served by operational marketing networks (Bay, 
1998). A Hicks-neutral technological improvement is a reasonable representation of the first two 
improvements, which are the more likely advances to come about in the near term. 
Regarding marketing margins, the 15% shock introduced in the simulations reflects the 
effects of the war, which ended only in 1992. The war devastated rural infrastructure in particular 
(Arndt, Jensen, and Tarp, 1999). Substantial efforts have been undertaken to improve 
infrastructure and provide market information. These investments, combined with a general 
growth in the sophistication of marketing sector participants, should lead to approximately a 15% 
increase in the efficiency of the marketing system relative to the level observed in 1995.  
We turn now to analysis of these eight simulations. Non-gender related aspects are 
considered first and subsequently we discuss gender specific results. 
Table 2 shows the impact of the alternative scenarios on cassava production, price, and 
the risk premium. In the no risk scenarios, the risk variable has a value of one reflecting no risk 
premium. In the risk scenarios, the risk variable is endogenous with a starting value of 1.3 
reflecting a premium of 0.3.x In these scenarios, the premium will vary depending upon the 
shock. If the shock causes the opportunity cost of attaining the safety first level of cassava 
production to increase, the risk premium will increase. If, on the other hand, the shock reduces 
the opportunity cost of attaining the safety first level of cassava production, the risk variable will 
decrease towards its lower bound value of one, reflecting a risk premium of zero. Once the risk 
variable attains a value of one, cassava production is permitted to increase above the safety first 
level.xi 
 
 [Table 2 about here] 
 
Not surprisingly, there are considerable differences in production and price movements 
for cassava between the risk and no risk scenarios. For example, in experiment one where 
productivity increases for all crops excepting cassava, the no risk scenario predicts a small 
increase in cassava production. This comes about to satisfy increased cassava demand due to 
higher income. There are no exports or imports of cassava; so domestic supply equals domestic 
demand in equilibrium. In contrast, in the risk scenario, production of cassava remains at the 
minimum safety first level while the risk premium declines. In the risk scenario for experiment 
two (productivity increases for all agricultural activities), the risk premium disappears and 
cassava production increases 9.4% over the safety first level. This compares to a 25.2% increase 
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in cassava production for the no risk scenario. Due to the muted production response, cassava 
price movements in the risk scenario are far less pronounced as well.  
When marketing margins are reduced (experiment three), cassava production is projected 
to decline very slightly in the no risk scenario.xii This occurs even though marketing margins on 
cassava production are very high relative to other crops. The small share of cassava marketed in 
total production supplies the explanation. Only about 8% of cassava production is marketed. 
When marketing margins are reduced, demand for marketed cassava increases. However, this 
increase is more than compensated for by a decline in home consumption of cassava. The 
resulting decline in cassava production frees resources, which in the present model are allocated 
to production of more market oriented crops. The results from experiment four, the combined 
experiment, are roughly additive from the two preceding experiments. 
Some additional comments on technical change in cassava merit mention. Cassava is 
widely regarded as a neglected crop in agricultural research (Cock, 1985; CIAT, 1999). One 
reason for this neglect is the low share of production of cassava that is marketed. For 
Mozambique, the logic of neglecting cassava research due to a low marketed share is dubious. 
Caloric intake for most of the rural population is insufficient. As a result, increases in home 
consumption of cassava (a 27% increase is predicted in the no risk scenario) are a good thing. 
However, since cassava is a risk reducing crop, an improvement in cassava technology is also 
likely to reduce the risk premium or insurance cost associated with cassava production. As shown 
in the risk scenario, the level of cassava production remains relatively constant after 
technological change in cassava. It is the risk premium that declines. With the technological 
improvement, the resources necessary to meet the safety first requirement are reduced. For 
example, considering experiment 2, the increase in grain production is 51% in the risk scenario 
compared with 44% in the no risk scenario. The differential reflects resources allocated to grain 
production rather than to cassava production. The effect is similar, though less pronounced, for 
most other agricultural activities. 
At this point, it is also worth considering the omission of female labor time allocated to 
cassava processing. In the more realistic risk scenario this omission is not critical. If cassava 
production levels change relatively little, total time allocation to cassava processing remains 
unaffected. Overall, results are likely to be very similar. In the no risk scenario, on the other 
hand, explicit treatment of cassava processing would quite likely influence some of the results. In 
particular, the increase in cassava production induced by technical advance would almost surely 
be attenuated as the demands on female labor time for processing would preclude a large 
expansion of cassava production. The net effect on female labor time allocated to cassava and 
cassava processing combined is an empirical question. 
Table 3 shows real gross domestic product (GDP) and nominal absorption for the eight 
experiments. In CGE models, only relative prices matter. To establish a reference point, one 
price, known as the numeraire, is fixed. We choose the consumer price index as the model 
numeraire. As a result, nominal absorption (or absorption as read directly from model output) is 
effectively deflated by the consumer price index and is an appropriate welfare indicator. In a 
macroeconomic perspective, the difference in welfare between the risk and no risk scenarios is 
very small. However, two items do emerge from the Table. First, due to the importance of 
cassava as a crop, technology gains in cassava production provide substantial gains to the 
economy. Welfare increases by an additional 1.5% from experiment one to experiment two. 
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Second, note that simultaneous improvements in agricultural technology and marketing 
efficiency interact. The welfare gains in experiment four exceed the sum of welfare gains from 
experiments two and three by 1.2% and 1.1% in the no risk and risk scenarios respectively. In 
other words, these synergy effects account for about 9% of the total welfare gain in experiment 
four under both the no risk and risk scenarios. 
 
 [Tables 3, 4, and 5 about here] 
 
Table 4 shows agricultural terms of trade. This measure is simply a ratio of price indices 
for the agricultural and non-agricultural sectors. An increase in this measure indicates that 
agricultural prices are rising relative to non-agricultural prices. A variety of price indices 
(consumer, producer, export, etc.) may be used. The terms of trade measure shown in Table 4 is 
the relative price of value added in the agricultural and non-agricultural sectors. As is standard 
following an agricultural productivity shock, agricultural terms of trade decline indicating 
transmission of some of the benefits of the productivity increase to the rest of the economy 
through lower agricultural prices. Other terms of trade measures show roughly similar declines. 
For the productivity shocks, the value added terms of trade declines are smaller in the risk 
scenarios. This is due primarily to the firmness of cassava prices in the risk scenario compared 
with the no risk scenario (see Table 2). 
Table 5 presents household welfare, as measured by equivalent variation, for urban and 
rural households.xiii A total welfare measure is also provided. Despite the terms of trade decline, 
rural households benefit substantially from agricultural technology improvements. Gains from 
marketing efficiency improvements are shared roughly equally between the urban and the rural 
household. As with nominal absorption, interaction effects between agricultural technology 
improvements and increases in efficiency in the marketing system lead to greater than additive 
benefits to both rural and urban households in the combined experiment (experiment four). 
While total welfare gains are very similar between the risk and no risk scenarios, the 
distribution of benefits between rural and urban households is somewhat different. Specifically, 
rural households gain less from agricultural technology improvement when risk is introduced 
into the model. The intuition behind this shift in gain between rural and urban households is as 
follows. Equivalent variation measures consumption of goods. In the no risk scenario, resource 
allocation is unfettered by risk considerations. An increase in cassava production technology 
increases cassava production. Since only 8% of this production is marketed in the base case, most 
of the increase in cassava production is home consumed. More than 90% of this home 
consumption occurs in rural households. xiv  The increase in cassava consumption increases 
welfare, particularly rural household welfare. In the risk case, the increase in cassava technology 
impacts the risk premium rather than cassava production. Instead of increasing cassava 
production, resources are allocated to other crops, all of which tend to have a higher marketed 
share of production. While the share of marketed production is by no means fixed, it is a very 
important determinant of first order impacts of the technology or marketing efficiency shock. In 
the risk scenario, the increase in production of crops other than cassava tends to push more goods 
into the marketing channels where urban consumers can access them. As a result, urban welfare 
tends to be higher and rural welfare lower in the risk scenario compared with the no risk 
scenario. 
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Factor returns represent a final welfare indicator.xv These are presented in Table 6. The 
rural household in the CGE model represents an average rural household. This household owns 
some non-agricultural labor (family members working in the city or in rural industry) and some 
capital. However, as indicated in section two, a large number of rural households own only male 
and female agricultural labor. For these typically very poor households, returns to labor are 
probably a better welfare indicator than the equivalent variation measures presented in Table 5.  
 
 [Table 6 about here] 
 
Let us first focus analysis on experiments one and two. A first noteworthy impact of the 
technology shocks is the effect on the return to capital, which increases dramatically. Part of the 
explanation lies in the choice of the consumer price index (CPI) as numeraire. Since food is such 
a large part of the household consumption basket, food price declines raise the price of 
non-agricultural goods, such as capital and non-agricultural labor, relative to the CPI. Marketing 
margins represent the second major push factor on returns to capital. The commerce sector, 
which supplies marketing services, is a large sector representing about 22% of total value added 
in the 1995 SAM. It is also capital intensive with capital accounting for 68% of factor cost. Since 
agriculture and processed food account for almost all of the sales of the commerce sector, 
technological change in agriculture substantially increases demand for marketing services from 
the commerce sector. This increase in demand is reinforced by a consumer preference structure 
that allocates greater shares of marginal income to marketed commodities. Expansion of the 
commerce sector (output increases by 5% and price by 9.8% in experiment two) has a strong 
impact on the return to capital. 
The second important impact in experiments one and two concerns the returns to male 
and female agricultural labor. Wage rates to male agricultural labor decline slightly while female 
agricultural labor rates rise. This is a crop composition effect. By construction, male agricultural 
labor tends to be more highly involved in production of goods with a relatively high marketed 
share. The share weighted average proportion of production marketed is 40% for males and 29% 
for females.xvi Given the increase in the price of marketing services provided by the commerce 
sector, the relatively heavy involvement of males in marketed production tends to reduce male 
wages. In other words, male wages decline slightly to accommodate the increase in the price of 
marketing services. Since female labor is more concentrated in activities with relatively low 
marketed shares of production, the effect of increases in the price of marketing services is less 
strong and female wages tend to rise.  
There are also important differences in impacts on female wages between the risk and no 
risk scenarios in experiments one and two. The relative firmness of cassava prices, due to the 
presence of the risk premium, makes the difference. As pointed out above, in the risk scenario, 
the risk reducing properties of cassava cause greater allocation of resources to cassava than 
ordinary profit maximization would dictate. This “over-allocation” of resources comes at the cost 
of reduced returns to factors allocated to cassava production as represented by the risk premium 
(see equation (3)). Since female labor represents by far the largest factor cost share in cassava 
production (nearly 80% since the contribution of capital in cassava production is negligible) and 
since the value of cassava production is large, the risk premium substantially dampens female 
wage rates in particular.xvii As the risk premium declines in response to the technology shocks 
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(see Table 2), returns to female labor allocated to cassava production increase. This has the effect 
of supporting the overall female wage. 
Finally, it is worth noting that the interaction effects between agricultural technology 
improvements and increases in marketing efficiency, captured in experiment four, are strong for 
agricultural wages, particularly male agricultural wages. In the risk scenario, the interaction 
effects add an additional 4.5% to the additive percentage wage increases from experiments two 
and three for male labor and 3.5% for female labor. In other words, interaction effects account for 
27% and 22% of the agricultural labor wage gains in experiment four for males and females 
respectively. Interaction effects are not nearly as pronounced for the other factors of production. 
These large interaction effects in agricultural labor wage rates (male and female) are due to the 
relatively greater importance of marketing margins in the primary agriculture and primary 
agriculture processing sectors. The larger interaction effects for male labor compared with female 
labor are due to the relative concentration of male labor in agricultural activities where the 
marketed share is relatively high. 
 
 
5. CONCLUSIONS AND SUGGESTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
 
The results lead to the following conclusions. 
 
· General agricultural technology improvements induce important welfare gains for 
the economy in general and rural households in particular. 
· Regardless of whether risk is a factor in cassava production, technological 
improvements in cassava production have strong welfare effects. 
· If, as is likely, risk reduction is a factor in cassava production, impacts of 
technological improvement in cassava are likely to be particularly positive to rural 
women. With improved cassava technology, women have the opportunity to 
allocate time to other activities, including more market oriented crops. In addition, 
the factor returns penalty to risk reduction, which weighs particularly heavily on 
female agricultural labor due to its high level of involvement in cassava 
production, declines. As a result of this decline in the risk premium, female wage 
rates tend to improve with improved technology in cassava. Women would also 
have the possibility of reallocating time formerly devoted to cassava production to 
for example domestic tasks or leisure. This possibility is not, however, captured in 
the model. In this case, female wage gains for agricultural labor would tend to be 
even stronger following technological change in cassava due to an effective 
decline in the supply of female agricultural labor.  
· Recent research points strongly to increased household welfare stemming from 
increased female cash income and time allocation to domestic tasks (Haddad, 
forthcoming). It can also be recalled that Elson (1989, p. 73) argues that a 
recognition of the crucial role of women cultivators in food production should 
lead to a greater focus on increasing their productivity in growing staple foods 
such as cassava. The analysis in this paper support this. Consequently, technical 
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change in cassava appears to be a particularly strong lever for increasing rural 
household welfare. 
· Technological change in agriculture and marketing system improvements interact 
with significant additional benefits accruing to both male and female occupants of 
rural households. These interaction effects are significant in both the risk and no 
risk scenarios. 
 
The research presented here represents an attempt at incorporating gender into CGE 
models. Much remains to be done in responding adequately to this challenge. With reference to 
Mozambique, firming our understanding of the functioning of the agricultural sector, through 
continued data collection and analysis, is a clear priority. This would permit, for example, a 
richer specification of gender and risk issues. More information is also desirable to understand 
more fully the importance of household level productive activities such as food processing. In 
addition, further household and regional disaggregation would permit, for example, the model to 
capture regional variation in gender roles in agricultural production. Finally, with reference to 
more general gender-related modeling issues, it would be highly relevant and challenging to 
examine intra-household production activities and resource allocation within a CGE model.  
 
NOTES 
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APPENDIX: CGE MODEL DEFINITIONS AND EQUATIONS 
 
(a) Indices 
 
j Activities 
Aliases of j: activ, activ1 
Subsets of j: 
iaga  Agricultural activities 
iagr  Risk constrained agricultural activities 
pactiv  Productive activities 
imr  Marketing activities 
iagn  Non-agricultural activities 
i Commodities  
Aliases of i: comm, comm1 
Subsets of i: 
im  Imported commodities 
imn  Non-imported commodities 
ie  Exported commodities 
ien  Non-exported commodities 
f Factors of Production 
Subsets of f: 
aglabo   Agricultural labor† 
naglabo  Non-agricultural labor 
h Households 
 
 
(b) Parameters  
  
a(comm,activ)  Input-output coefficients 
ac(comm) aCi Armington function shift parameter 
ad(activ) aDj Production function shift parameter 
af af CET labor function shift parameter 
                                                 
† The elements of this sub-set of f are female and male agricultural labor. 
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alpha(f,activ) αi Factor share parameter - production function 
at(comm) aTi CET export function shift parameter 
betah(comm,hh)  LES marginal consumption level of home produced goods 
betam(comm,hh)  LES marginal consumption level of marketed commodities 
cpiwtsh(comm)  Price index weights for home consumed goods in consumer 
price index 
cpiwtsm(comm)  Price index weights for marketed goods in consumer price index 
delta(comm)  Armington function share parameter 
esr0  Enterprise savings rate 
eta(comm)  Export demand price elasticitity 
etr0  Enterprise tax rate 
exrb   Base exchange rate 
gamma(comm) γi CET export function share parameter 
gammah(comm,hh)  LES minimum consumption level of home produced goods 
gammam(comm,hh)  LES minimum consumption level of marketed commodities 
qd(activ)  Dummy variable for computing ad(activ) 
gles(comm)  Government consumption share 
imake(activ,comm)   Make row coefficients 
makef(activ,comm)   Make FLOWS matrices  
mrd(comm)  Domestic margin coefficient 
mrdf(comm)  Value of margins on domestics 
mre(comm)  Export margin coefficient 
mref(comm)  Value of margins on imports 
mrm(comm)  Import margin coefficient 
mrmf(comm)  Value of margins on imports 
pcb(comm)   Base final consumption commodity price 
pdab(activ)  Base domestic price 
pdcb(comm)  Base domestic marketed supply price 
pdchb(comm)  Base domestic home consumed supply price 
ppiwts(activ)  Price index weights for producer price index 
pqab(activ)  Base composite activity price 
pqqb(comm)  Base composite consumption price 
pqxb(comm)  Base composite commodity price 
pweb(comm)  Base export price 
pwmb(comm)  Base import price 
pvb(activ)   Base value added price 
rhoc(comm) ρCi Armington function exponent 
rhof ρf CET labor function exponent 
rhot(comm) ρTi CET export function exponent 
risklow(activ)  Lower bound on production for risk 
rmd(comm)  Ratio of imports to domestic sales 
sdistr(hh)  Distributed profit shares 
sremit(hh)  Remittance shares 
strans(hh)  Government transfer shares 
SUPERNUM(hh)  Household supernumerary income 
tau τ CET labor function share parameter 
tcb(comm)   Base consumption tax rate 
tc0(comm)  Consumption tax (+) or subsidy (-) rates 
te(comm)  Export tax (+) or subsidy (-) rates 
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teb(comm)   Base export tax 
tf(f)  Factor tax rates 
th(hh)  Household tax rate 
thmul0  Uniform household tax rate multiplier 
tm(comm)  Tariff rates on imports 
tmb(comm)   Base tariff rate 
txb(activ)   Base indirect tax 
tx0(activ)  Output tax rates 
ymap(instp,f)  Factors to private institutions map 
 
 
(c) Variables 
 
 
(i) Prices 
 
 
 
 EXR  Exchange rate (Mt per world $) 
 PC(comm) Consumption price of composite goods 
 PDC(comm) Domestic marketed commodity goods price 
 PDCH(comm) Domestic home commodity goods price 
 PE(comm) Price of exports 
 PINDEX Producer prices or GDP index 
 PM(comm) Price of imports 
 PQA(activ) Average production composite activity price 
 PQQ(comm) Price of composite consumption good 
 PQX(comm) Average production composite commodity price 
 PV(activ) Value added price 
 RISK(activ) Risk premium complementarity 
 
 
 
(ii) Production 
 
 DC(comm) Domestic commodity marketed consumption 
 DCH(comm)  Domestic commodity home consumption 
 E(comm)  Exports 
 M(comm) Imports 
 QQ(comm) Composite goods demand 
 QX(comm) Domestic composite commodities output 
 QA(activ) Domestic composite activities output 
 
 
(iii) Factors 
 
 
 
 FDSC(f,activ) Factor demand by sector 
 FS(f) Factor supply 
 FSLAB Aggregate labor supply 
 WF(f) Average factor price 
 WFDIST(f,activ) Factor price sectoral proportionality ratios 
 WFLAB Aggregate average labor force 
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 YFCTR(f)  Factor income 
 
 
(iv) Income and expenditure 
 
 CAPINV Real private investment 
 CAPINV Total private investment 
 CDH(comm,hh) Final demand for home produced commodities 
 CDM(comm,hh) Final demand for marketed commodities 
 CI(comm) Final demand for private productive investment 
 CONTAX Consumption tax revenue 
 DISTR Distributed profits 
 ENTSAV Enterprise savings 
 ENTTAX Enterprise tax 
 ESR Enterprise savings rate 
 ETR  Enterprise tax rate 
 EXPTAX Export subsidy payments 
 FACTAX Factor tax revenue 
 FAIDGIN Aid in government organization budget 
 FAIDNGO Aid in non government organization budget 
 FSAV Net foreign savings 
 GD(comm)  Final demand for government consumption 
 GDTOT Total volume of government recurrent consumption 
 GI(comm) Final demand for government productive investment 
 GININV Total government investment 
 GINREV Government investment account revenue 
 GINSAV Government investment account savings 
 GOVTH Government transfers to households 
 GOVTE Government transfers to enterprises 
 GRESAV Recurrent government account savings 
 GREREV Government recurrent account revenue 
 HHSAV Total household savings 
 HHTAX Household tax revenue 
 ID(comm) Final demand for productive investment 
 INDTAX Indirect tax revenue 
 INT(comm) Intermediates uses 
 INVEST Nominal private investment 
 MPS(hh) Marginal propensity to save by household type 
 NGOD(comm)  Final demand for non government organization consumption 
 NGOREV Non government organization account revenue 
 REMIT Remittances 
 SAVING Total nominal private savings 
 SAVING Total savings 
 TARIFF Tariff revenue 
 THMUL Uniform household tax rate multiplier 
 WALRAS1 Slack variable for savings investment 
 YE Enterprise income 
 YH(hh) Household income 
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 Yinstp(instp) Private institutional income 
 
 
(v) GDP and other derived variables 
 
 ABSORB Absorption in market prices 
 GDPVA Value added in market prices GDP 
 GOVRABS Government recurrent to absorption ratio 
 GOVIABS Government investment to absorption ratio 
 INVGDP Investment to GDP ratio 
 RGDP Real GDP 
 
 
(vi) Taxes 
 
 
 
 TC(comm) Consumption tax rate 
 TX(activ) Output tax rate 
 
 
(vii) Other variables 
 
 
 
 FOODAID(comm) Food aid in form of composite commodity 
 TRADM(activ) Demand for import commerce service by trade 
 
 
(d) Equations 
 
(i) Prices 
 
D1 PM
im
 = pwm
im
  (1+tm
im
)  EXR
+ MRM
im
  
imr
PQA
imr
 
Import prices 
D2 Error! Export prices 
D3 
PDC
i
 = PDCH
i
 + MRD
i
  
imr
PQA
imr
 Marketed commodity prices 
D4 
PQQ
i
 = 
PDC
i
  DC
i
 + PM
i
  M
i
QQ
i
 
Composite commodity prices 
D5 
PQX
i
 = 
PDCH
i
  (DC
i
 + DCH
i
) + PE
i
  E
i
QX
i
 
Producer commodity prices 
D6 PC
i
 = PQQ
i
  (1 + tc
i
) Consumer prices 
D7 
PQA
pactiv
 = 
i
imake
pactiv,i
  PQX
i
 
Producer activity prices 
D8 
PV
j
 = PQA
j
  (1 - tx
j
) - 
i
PC
i
  a
ij
 Value-added prices net of output taxes  
D9 
WFLAB  FSLAB = 
lab
FS
lab
  WF
lab
 Composite wage 
D10 
PINDEX = 
i
cpiwts
i
  





PCi
pindex0
  
Consumer price index 
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(ii) Quantities 
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1 
QA
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D
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f
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j
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Cobb-Douglas production function 
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jf
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  QA
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Commodity/marketing services relationship 
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pactiv
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pactiv,i
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pactiv
 
Commodity/activity relationship 
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τ FSρ
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8 Error! 
Gross domestic output as a composite good for 
ie  i 
D1
9 QXien  =  DCien + DCHien Gross domestic output for ien  i 
D2
0 
E
ie
  =  (DC
ie
+DCH
ie
)  





PDCHie  γie
PE
ie
  (1-γ
ie
) 


1
1 - ρ
T
i
 
Export supply 
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 Total supply of composite good - Armington 
function for im  i 
D2
2 QQimn    =  DCimn Total supply for imn  i 
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  F.O.C for cost minimization for composite 
good for im  i 
 
(iii) Income 
 
D24 
YFCTR
f
   =  
i
WF
f
  FDSC
jf
  





WFDISTjf
RISK
j
 
Factor income 
D25 
Yinstp
instp
 = 
f
ymap
instp,f
  YFCTR
f
 
Private institutional income 
D26 YE =Yinstp
enterp
 + GOVTE Enterprise income 
D27 YE = DISTR + ENTTAX + ENTSAV Enterprise expenditure 
D28 
YH
hh
 = Yinstp
hh
 + sdistr
hh
  DISTR
 + sremit
hh
  REMIT  EXR + strans
hh
  GOVTH
 
Household income 
D29 
INDTAX = 
activ
tx
activ
  PQA
activ
  QA
activ
 
Indirect taxes on domestic production 
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D30 
EXPTAX = 
ie
te
ie
  E
ie
  pwe
ie
  EXR 
Export subsidy payments 
D31 
TARIFF = 
im
tm
im
  M
im
  pwm
im
  EXR 
Tariff revenue 
D32 
CONTAX = 
comm
tc
comm
  PQQ
comm
  QQ
comm
 
Consumption taxes 
D33 
FACTAX = 
f
tf
f
  YFCTR
f
 
Factor tax 
D34 ENTTAX = ETR  YE Enterprise tax 
D35 
HHTAX = 
hh
th
hh
  YH
hh
  THMUL 
Total household tax collected by govt. 
D36 ENTSAV = ESR  (YE - ENTTAX) Enterprise savings 
D37 
HHSAV = 
hh
MPS
hh
  YH
hh
  (1 - th
hh
  THMUL) 
Household savings 
D38 GREREV = INDTAX + EXPTAX + TARIFF 
+ CONTAX + FACTAX + ENTTAX + HHTAX
 
Government recurrent account revenue 
D39 
GINREV = FAIDGIN  EXR 
Government investment account 
revenue  
D40 
NGOREV = FAIDNGO  EXR 
Non government organization account 
revenue 
 
D41 
SAVING = HHSAV + ENTSAV 
+ GRESAV + GINSAV + FSAV  EXR
 
Total savings 
 
(iv) Expenditure†† 
 
D42 
Error! 
Private consumption for marketed 
commodities 
D43 
Error! 
Private consumption behavior for home 
consumption 
D44 Error! Government consumption  
D45 
GREREV = GDTOT + GOVTE + GOVTH + GRESAV 
Government recurrent budget 
constraint 
D46 Error! Real government investment 
D47 
GINREV = GININV + GINSAV 
Government investment budget 
constraint 
D48 
NGOD
comm
  PC
comm
 = ngoshr
comm
  NGOREV 
Non government organization 
consumption 
D49 CI
comm
  PC
comm
 = cishr
comm
  CAPINV Real private investment 
D50 ID
comm
 = CI
comm
 + GI
comm
 Investment by sector of origin 
D51 
INVEST = 
comm
PC
comm
  CI
comm
 
Total private investment at market 
prices 
 
                                                 
†† Equations D42 and D43 form a single LES and as such could be written out as one equation only. They are 
separated here for modeling convenience. 
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(v) Market clearing 
 
D52 QQ
comm
 + FOODAID
comm
 =
comm
 + 
hh
CDM
comm,hh
+ GD
comm
 + NGOD
comm
 + ID
comm
 
Commodities market equilibrium 
D53 
DCH
comm
 = 
hh
CDH
comm,hh
 
Home consumption equilibrium 
D54 
activ
FDSC
f,activ
 = FS
f
 
Factor market equilibrium††† 
D55 

im
pwm
im
  M
im
 =

ie
pwe
ie
  E
ie
+ FSAV + FAIDGIN + FAIDNGO + REMIT
 
Current account balance 
D56 SAVING = INVEST + WALRAS1 Savings-investment equilibrium 
D57 QA
imr
  risklow
imr
 Risk related minimum production 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
††† In the present analysis FSf is fixed for non-agricultural labor as well as for the two elements of agricultural labor 
(i.e., female and male agricultural labor). 
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Table 1: Female labor share by agricultural activity 
 
 
 
Female (per cent) 
 
Grains 
 
69  
 
Cassava 
 
80  
 
Other basic food crops 
 
70  
 
Raw cashew 
 
60  
 
Raw cotton 
 
50  
 
Other export crops 
 
20  
 
Livestock 
 
10  
 
Forestry 
 
50  
 
 
  
Table 2: Cassava production, price, and risk premium 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Per cent deviation from base values 
 
 
 
 
 
Base run 
 
 
 
Exp. 1 
 
Exp. 2 
 
Exp. 3 
 
Exp. 4 
 
No risk 
 
Production 
 
10.3 
 
 
 
3.5 
 
25.2 
 
-0.7 
 
23.4 
 
 
 
Price 
 
1 
 
 
 
2.2 
 
-20.3 
 
10.3 
 
-9.9 
 
 
 
Risk premium 
 
1.00 
 
 
 
0 
 
0 
 
0 
 
0 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Risk 
 
Production 
 
10.3 
 
 
 
0 
 
9.4 
 
0.0 
 
7.7 
 
 
 
Price 
 
1 
 
 
 
7.4 
 
-4.0 
 
9.2 
 
8.9 
 
 
 
Risk premiuma 
 
1.30 
 
 
 
-30 
 
-100 
 
6.7 
 
-100 
 
a Calculated using the formula (new – base)/(base – 1). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Table 3: Macroeconomic indicators 
 
 
 
 
 
1011 Mta 
Base run 
 
 
 
Per cent deviation from base values  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Exp. 1 
 
Exp. 2 
 
Exp. 3 
 
Exp. 4  
No risk 
 
Real GDP 
 
172.1 
 
 
 
5.1 
 
6.8 
 
5.0 
 
12.2 
 
 
 
Nominal 
absorption 
 
223.3 
 
 
 
5.3 
 
6.8 
 
4.9 
 
12.9 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Risk 
 
Real GDP 
 
172.1 
 
 
 
5.2 
 
6.7 
 
5.0 
 
12.2 
 
 
 
Nominal 
absorption 
 
223.3 
 
 
 
5.2 
 
6.7 
 
4.9 
 
12.7 
 
a The metical (Mt) is the local currency. The exchange rate was 8,890 Mt/US$ in 1995. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Table 4: Agricultural terms of trade (value added) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Per cent deviation from base values 
 
 
 
Base run 
 
 
 
Exp. 1 
 
Exp. 2 
 
Exp. 3 
 
Exp. 4 
 
No risk 
 
100.0 
 
 
 
-21.9 
 
-29.4 
 
7.1 
 
-22.4 
 
Risk 
 
100.0 
 
 
 
-21.4 
 
-27.9 
 
7.0 
 
-20.5 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Table 5: Equivalent variation 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Per cent of base consumption 
 
 
 
 
 
Base run 
 
 
 
Exp. 1 
 
Exp. 2 
 
Exp. 3 
 
Exp. 4 
 
No risk 
 
Urban 
 
0.0 
 
 
 
4.7 
 
5.2 
 
4.6 
 
10.4 
 
 
 
Rural 
 
0.0 
 
 
 
8.7 
 
12.3 
 
4.6 
 
18.2 
 
 
 
Total 
 
0.0 
 
 
 
6.6 
 
8.5 
 
4.6 
 
14.1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Risk 
 
Urban 
 
0.0 
 
 
 
4.9 
 
5.8 
 
4.6 
 
11.1 
 
 
 
Rural 
 
0.0 
 
 
 
8.5 
 
11.5 
 
4.7 
 
17.4 
 
 
 
Total 
 
0.0 
 
 
 
6.6 
 
8.5 
 
4.6 
 
14.1 
 
 
 
  
Table 6: Factor prices 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Per cent deviation from base values 
 
 
 
 
 
Base run 
 
 
 
Exp. 1 
 
Exp. 2 
 
Exp. 3 
 
Exp. 4 
 
No risk 
 
Male ag. labor 
 
1.0 
 
 
 
-1 
 
-3 
 
12.3 
 
16.2 
 
 
 
Female ag. labor 
 
1.0 
 
 
 
2.3 
 
0.3 
 
10.9 
 
14.2 
 
 
 
Non-ag. labor 
 
1.0 
 
 
 
6.6 
 
8.9 
 
4.9 
 
14.4 
 
 
 
Capital 
 
1.0 
 
 
 
8.1 
 
10.6 
 
2.0 
 
13.4 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Risk 
 
Male ag. labor 
 
1.0 
 
 
 
-0.2 
 
-0.3 
 
12.2 
 
16.4 
 
 
 
Female ag. labor 
 
1.0 
 
 
 
2.8 
 
1.9 
 
10.8 
 
16.2 
 
 
 
Non-ag. labor 
 
1.0 
 
 
 
6.5 
 
8.6 
 
4.9 
 
14.0 
 
 
 
Capital 
 
1.0 
 
 
 
8.0 
 
10.5 
 
2.0 
 
13.2 
 
 
 
                                                 
i. The World Bank’s Mozambique Agricultural Sector Memorandum (1997) asserts that rural women work, 
on average, 14-16 hours per day, though it is not clear where these figures were obtained. 
ii. Land is generally regarded as abundant though there is evidence of land shortages in certain regions 
(MAP/MSU, 1992). 
iii.  Excellent descriptions of standard neoclassical CGE models are available in Dervis, de Melo, and Robinson 
(1982) and Devarajan, Go, Lewis, Robinson, and Sinko (1997).  
iv.  The price gap may also reflect some degree of imperfect competition. In this paper, they are assumed to 
reflect real costs. 
v. Legitimate concerns about capital intensity data for developing economies exist. Difficulties in tracking 
labor inputs in the informal sector can result in labor inputs being counted erroneously as returns to capital, which 
are typically calculated as a residual. Pains were taken in the development of the Mozambican national accounts and 
the subsequent social accounting matrix to avoid this pitfall. While the most visible element of the commerce sector, 
street hawking, is labor intensive, the capital intensity of transport, inventory, and trading activities, combined with 
high costs of capital, make the sector capital intensive. 
vi. Alternative formulations to the LES are certainly possible and might well be desirable. For example, one 
could specify a two stage budget process where the shares of home and marketed consumption for each good are 
determined in the lower nest and consumption quantities of the composite are determined in the upper nest. Other 
alternatives also exist. This is an important area for future research.  
vii.  Gender asymmetries have been shown to be important for intra-household resource allocation (Haddad, 
Hoddinott, and Alderman, 1997), and Hoddinott and Haddad (1995) find that as women’s share of cash income 
increases, the household budget share of food tends to increase and the household budget share on alcohol and 
tobacco tends to decline. 
                                                                                                                                                              
viii. A version of the model permits migration between the male agricultural labor and the non-agricultural labor 
pools. Simulations with this specification lead to similar conclusions. 
ix. This implies an elasticity of substitution of one between male and female labor in agricultural production. 
x. There are no data on the appropriate value for the risk premium. This level allows for elimination of the risk 
premium, and consequent increases in cassava production, in some scenarios.  
xi. The PATH solver automatically handles these complementary slackness conditions (Dirkse and Ferris, 
1995). 
xii. This translates into a slight increase in the risk premium in the risk scenario as shown in Table 2. 
xiii. Formally, equivalent variation shows the amount of money, at base prices and income levels, that would 
have to be given to (or taken from) the household in order to achieve the utility level attained by the household in the 
experiment. Table 5 shows this measure as a percent of base income. 
xiv. Urban households in Mozambique often maintain a field in the countryside where they produce goods for 
home consumption.  
xv. Robinson and Thierfelder (1999) point out that factor returns are not always valid as a welfare indicator. 
However, for this case of technology shocks and marketing margin improvements, they are a valid indicator. 
xvi. Marketing margins are slightly higher on average for goods produced by females. This would tend to 
increase the role of margins for females relative to males. However, this slight difference in average margins is not 
enough to offset the effects of male tendency to produce for the market and female tendency to produce for home 
consumption. 
xvii. Cassava accounts for 30% of female agricultural labor factor returns. 
 
